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CONGRESS AND THE MULTIPARTY, 
MULTIFORUM TRIAL JURISDICTION  
ACT OF 2002: MEANINGFUL REFORM OR A 
COMEDY OF ERRORS? 
ANGELA J. RAFOTH 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 20, 2003 a fast-moving inferno tore through the 
Station, a nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island, killing one 
hundred people.1 Considered one of the worst fires at a social 
assembly in United States history,2 the accident has led to substantial 
litigation.3 Private litigation arising from mass tragedies is not a new 
phenomenon and often involves many suits filed in different 
jurisdictions by different plaintiffs or sets of plaintiffs. Multiple 
lawsuits are particularly problematic in the context of a mass accident 
because, although mass accident cases usually are not appropriate for 
class action treatment, mass accident suits by individual plaintiffs 
often involve similar or identical questions of liability, generally 
against the same set of defendants. Traditionally, consolidation of 
individual claims for joint treatment has been frequently impractical 
or impossible because only some potential plaintiffs have been 
eligible to bring their cases in federal court—under statutory diversity 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Angela J. Rafoth. 
 1. See Thomas Farragher & Douglas Belkin, Death Toll Reaches 96 in Fire at R.I. 
Nightclub, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22, 2003, at A1; Stephen Smith, 10 Weeks After R.I. Fire, 100th 
Victim Dies, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 2003, at B1. 
 2. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, FIRE SAFETY IN ASSEMBLY OCCUPANCIES: NFPA 
ADDRESSES NIGHTCLUB TRAGEDIES, at http://www.nfpa.org/Research/FireInvestigation/ 
RislandFire/RIFire.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also 
Peter Adoneit, The Station Nightclub Fire and Federal Jurisdictional Reach: The Multidistrict, 
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 243, 243 (2003) 
(dubbing the Station fire the fourth-worst nightclub fire in American history). 
 3. In anticipation of multiple complex suits related to the accident, the Rhode Island 
Superior Court designated a single judge to handle all pretrial proceedings related to the fire. 
Assignment of Justice for Multi-Case Management, Admin. Order No. 2003-4 (R.I. Super. Ct., 
Mar. 4, 2003). 
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jurisdiction4—whereas other plaintiffs have had recourse only to state 
courts. Such split litigation results in substantial time and cost 
inefficiencies for parties and courts and also can generate inconsistent 
outcomes based on substantially similar facts. 
In this environment of mass accident litigation, the Station fire is 
particularly important, because it represents the first accident to 
qualify for federal jurisdiction and consolidation under the 
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 (MPMF 2002)5 
and will become a test case for the ability of federal courts to handle 
complex mass accident litigation under this statute.6 MPMF 2002 
permits victims of accidents such as the Station fire to file suit in 
federal court based on only minimal diversity,7 enabling them to take 
advantage of significant procedural benefits such as nationwide 
service of process and intervention in existing, related suits.8 MPMF 
2002 is also intended to benefit mass accident defendants by allowing 
them the option, under certain circumstances, of removing and 
consolidating separate actions relating to the same qualifying 
accident.9 
Congress considered some form of multiparty, multiforum 
jurisdiction on several occasions, and MPMF 2002 consists largely of 
elements taken from those prior attempts.10 MPMF 2002 aims to 
address the long-recognized inefficiencies and inconsistencies of 
 
 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (listing the criteria for diversity jurisdiction). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11,020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826–29 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 
1391, 1441, 1697, 1785 (Supp. 2003)). MPMF 2002 became effective for accidents occurring on 
or after January 31, 2003. See id. § 11,020(c), 116 Stat. at 1829 (stating that the Act’s provisions 
would cover qualifying accidents occurring on or after the ninetieth day following enactment, 
meaning on or after January 31, 2003). 
 6. The first court to “bite the proverbial bullet” and interpret MPMF 2002 was the 
Federal District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which found that it had jurisdiction over 
five cases—two of which were filed there originally, and three of which were originally filed in 
Rhode Island state court. Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 48–49 (D.R.I. 2004); see 
Elizabeth Mehren, New Law Used to File Federal Suit in Rhode Island Club Fire, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2003, at A13. See generally Adoneit, supra note 2 (addressing the potential application 
of MPMF 2002 to litigation arising out of the Rhode Island fire). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a), (c)(1) (Supp. 2003). 
 8. See id. § 1697 (allowing nationwide service of process); id. § 1369(d) (permitting 
intervention). 
 9. See id. § 1441(e) (describing the conditions under which defendants may remove and 
consolidate actions); see also infra Part II.A. 
 10. Compare, e.g., Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 116 Stat. at 1826–
29, with The Judicial Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 7 (1998) (version referred to 
Senate Judiciary Committee on Apr. 24, 1998 after being received from House of 
Representatives). 
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duplicate litigation arising from a single mass tort, such as the Station  
fire.11 Prior to MPMF 2002—as remains true today, with respect to 
categories of complex litigation not covered by that statute—
jurisdictional and procedural constraints prevented joining all parties 
in a single state forum for consolidated litigation, requiring plaintiffs 
to file duplicate suits arising from the same accident.12 MPMF 2002 
provides limited federal jurisdiction so that, in a single accident 
resulting in at least seventy-five fatalities, a federal forum is available 
for consolidating all related litigation.13 Facilitating joint adjudication 
of such common claims can eliminate redundant litigation expenses 
and use of judicial resources, promote just resolution of claims, and 
prevent conflicting or inconsistent judgments. This Note analyzes the 
effectiveness of MPMF 2002 in achieving these benefits while 
balancing the interests of litigants against those of the federal and 
state judicial systems. 
This analysis of MPMF 2002 proceeds by examining four 
characteristics of the statutory scheme. Each of these four elements—
 
 11. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-276, at 6–7 (1999): 
The waste of judicial resources—and the costs to both plaintiffs and defendants—of 
litigating the same liability question several times over in separate lawsuits can be 
extreme. 
  Different expert consultants and witnesses may be retained by the different 
plaintiffs’ lawyers handling each case. The court in each lawsuit can issue its own 
subpoenas for records and for depositions of witnesses, potentially conflicting with 
the discovery scheduled in other lawsuits. Critical witnesses may be deposed for one 
suit and then redeposed by a different set of lawyers in a separate lawsuit. Identical 
questions of evidence and other points of law can arise in each of the separate suits, 
meaning that the parties in each case may have to brief and argue—and each court 
may have to resolve—the same issues that are being briefed, argued, and resolved in 
other cases, sometimes with results that conflict. 
 12. Id., at 7: 
Current efforts to consolidate all state and federal cases related to a common disaster 
are incomplete because current federal statutes restrict the ways in which 
consolidation can occur—apparently without any intention to limit consolidation. For 
example, plaintiffs who reside in the same state as any one of the defendants cannot 
file their cases in federal court because of a lack of complete diversity of citizenship, 
even if all parties to the lawsuit want the case consolidated. For those cases that 
cannot be brought into the federal system, no legal mechanism exists by which they 
can be consolidated, as state courts cannot transfer cases across state lines. In sum, 
full consolidation cannot occur in the absence of federal legislative redress. 
See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, 
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 9 (1986) (“The problem is the unavailability of 
any single forum in which to consolidate scattered, related litigation—a difficulty that is 
becoming more and more common given the increasing number of complex tort actions, such as 
those growing out of mass accidents and product liability claims.”). 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 1369; Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50 (D.R.I. 2004) (applying the 
statute for the first time and concluding that the Rhode Island nightclub fire falls within its 
scope). 
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original federal jurisdiction, intersystem consolidation, intrasystem 
consolidation, and procedural enablement—is necessary to 
consolidate effectively the related actions in a single forum. MPMF 
2002’s employment of each characteristic of consolidation determines 
the extent to which the Act will achieve its goal of making a single 
federal forum available for joint adjudication of claims arising from 
mass accidents. Only when all four of these components work 
effectively will mass accident plaintiffs, such as the victims of the 
Station nightclub fire, be able to consolidate their claims with those of 
plaintiffs already in federal court and achieve the efficiencies and 
forum choice intended by MPMF 2002. 
Part I of this Note examines the scope of MPMF 2002’s grant of 
original federal jurisdiction, including issues that are likely to arise in 
interpreting and applying the statutory text. Part II then looks at the 
mechanisms of intersystem consolidation (consolidation of cases 
pending in state and federal courts). Part II also examines drafting 
problems in the removal provision that may undermine its 
effectiveness, and the Part proposes statutory and common law 
workarounds. Part III proceeds by analyzing the capacity of MPMF 
2002 to affect intrasystem consolidation (consolidation of cases 
pending in different federal districts). Because the statutory provision 
authorizing consolidation for trial was omitted from the final version 
of the MPMF 2002 package, Part III focuses on the extent to which 
MPMF 2002 can accomplish its goals using existing transfer and 
consolidation mechanisms. Finally, Part IV examines the procedural 
features necessary for joint adjudication. This Part describes the 
impact of auxiliary mechanisms included in MPMF 2002, such as 
nationwide service of process, but it focuses particularly on the 
potential impact of the omission of a uniform choice-of-law provision. 
This Note’s conclusion is that, although MPMF 2002 marks an 
important step toward just and efficient adjudication of litigation 
arising from severe mass accidents, the imprecision with which 
Congress drafted the statute will make it necessary for Congress to 
enact modifications, or for courts to develop common law 
workarounds, to allow the intended consolidation and thereby 
achieve the statute’s policy goals. 
I.  MPMF 2002 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
The core of MPMF 2002 is a grant of original federal minimal 
diversity jurisdiction over a narrowly defined class of complex mass 
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tort litigation.14 This initial grant of jurisdiction expands the number 
of cases that can be brought in federal court, creating the potential for 
single-forum adjudication of common issues in cases arising from a 
single mass accident.15 MPMF 2002’s jurisdiction has the narrow goal 
 
 14. For reference throughout this discussion, the full text of section 1369 is as follows: 
(a) In general.—The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident, 
where at least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete location, if— 
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident took 
place in another State or other location, regardless of whether that defendant is 
also a resident of the State where a substantial part of the accident took place; 
(2) any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of whether such 
defendants are also residents of the same State or States; or 
(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different States. 
(b) Limitation of jurisdiction of district courts.—The district court shall abstain from 
hearing any civil action described in subsection (a) in which— 
(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of which 
the primary defendants are also citizens; and 
(2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that State. 
(c) Special rules and definitions. —For purposes of this section— 
(1) minimal diversity exists between adverse parties if any party is a citizen of a 
State and any adverse party is a citizen of another State, a citizen or subject of a 
foreign state, or a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title; 
(2) a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any State, and a citizen or subject 
of any foreign state, in which it is incorporated or has its principal place of 
business, and is deemed to be a resident of any State in which it is incorporated 
or licensed to do business or is doing business; 
(3) the term “injury” means— 
(A) physical harm to a natural person; and 
(B) physical damage to or destruction of tangible property, but only if 
physical harm described in subparagraph (A) exists; 
(4) the term “accident” means a sudden accident, or a natural event culminating 
in an accident, that results in death incurred at a discrete location by at least 75 
natural persons; and 
(5) the term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States. 
(d) Intervening parties.—In any action in a district court which is or could have been 
brought, in whole or in part, under this section, any person with a claim arising from 
the accident described in subsection (a) shall be permitted to intervene as a party 
plaintiff in the action, even if that person could not have brought an action in a 
district court as an original matter. 
(e) Notification of judicial panel on multidistrict litigation.—A district court in which 
an action under this section is pending shall promptly notify the judicial panel on 
multidistrict litigation of the pendency of the action. 
28 U.S.C. § 1369. 
 15. The definition of what would constitute a mass accident for this purpose proved 
difficult for Congress to agree on. One earlier version, for example, included a threshold of 
twenty-five fatalities or injuries resulting in at least $150,000 in damages per person. See 
Multidistrict, Multiforum, Multiparty Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, H.R. 860, 107th Cong. § 3 
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of facilitating joint adjudication of those mass accident claims facing 
the greatest risk of scattered and redundant litigation.16 Therefore, the 
statute is crafted to avoid infringing the rights of individual states to 
manage and adjudicate claims under state law when the claims arise 
from accidents with effects primarily limited to the individual states.17 
This Part analyzes the scope of MPMF 2002’s grant of original 
jurisdiction, including its exception for primarily local controversies. 
A. Getting into Federal Court: General Multiparty, Multiforum 
Jurisdiction 
The basic jurisdictional grant in MPMF 2002 covers “any civil 
action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises 
from a single accident[,] where at least 75 natural persons have died 
in the accident at a discrete location.”18 The minimal diversity 
requirement is necessary to keep the statute within Article III of the 
Constitution, and MPMF 2002 extends the authority of federal courts 
to that outer limit.19 This opens the federal courts to all plaintiffs 
when at least one plaintiff is a citizen of a different state than at least 
one defendant. This diversity rule is substantially more permissive 
 
(2001) (version referred to Senate Judiciary Committee on Mar. 15, 2001 after being received 
from House of Representatives). This version was rejected by the Senate before ultimately 
being reincarnated as MPMF 2002 with the seventy-five-fatality threshold. Although the 
enacted threshold of seventy-five fatalities severely limits the number of accidents likely to 
qualify for MPMF 2002 jurisdiction, it appears unlikely that Congress will lower the threshold. 
A change of the threshold to twenty-five was proposed as a technical amendment to MPMF 
2002 but was quickly deleted from the proposed legislation. Compare Multidistrict Litigation 
Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. § 3(b) (2003) (version introduced in House of 
Representatives on Apr. 11, 2003), with Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 
1768, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004) (version passed by House of Representatives on Mar. 24, 2004). 
 16. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 5 (2001) (“The [MPMF legislation] should reduce 
litigation costs as well as the likelihood of forum-shopping in airline accident cases; and an 
effective one-time determination of punitive damages would eliminate multiple or inconsistent 
awards arising from multiforum litigation.”). 
 17. See id. at 4 (reporting that Senate concerns over federal usurpation of control over 
predominantly local disputes best left to the states led Congress to include the abstention 
provision in MPMF 2002); see also AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS ch. 5, introductory cmt. at 219 (1994) (analyzing a 
conceptually similar proposal and concluding that “[a]bsent a means for compelling 
consolidation in a state court, a decision that it would be preferable to adjudicate the actions or 
claims in state court means that the federal courts should decline jurisdiction”). 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a). 
 19. Congress has authorized jurisdiction predicated on minimal diversity in one other 
limited situation, federal statutory interpleader. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000) (giving district 
courts original jurisdiction if, inter alia, two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship are 
involved in the controversy). 
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than the general statutory diversity rule requiring all plaintiffs to have 
citizenship diverse from that of all defendants (complete diversity).20 
Thus, in the example of litigation resulting from the Station fire, a 
Rhode Island plaintiff suing Rhode Island and California defendants 
could file suit in federal court under MPMF 2002 but otherwise would 
be limited to a state court action. 
Section 1369(a), which codifies MPMF 2002 jurisdiction, adopts 
additional criteria designed to target only those situations most prone 
to scattered litigation. Under these restrictions, a qualifying action 
must have either at least one defendant who resides in a state other 
than the state in which the accident occurred,21 at least two defendants 
who reside in different states,22 or multiple states in which substantial 
parts of the accident took place.23 MFMF 2002’s drafters adapted 
 
 20. The constitutional provision defining federal diversity jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 1, has been consistently interpreted as requiring only minimal diversity, should Congress 
choose to authorize jurisdiction to that extent. E.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 
U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967). It is the statutory authorization for general diversity jurisdiction, 28 
U.S.C. § 1332, that restricts jurisdiction to cases satisfying complete diversity. See Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (holding that jurisdiction cannot be supported unless 
each plaintiff and defendant is capable of obtaining jurisdiction in federal court). 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). Note that a defendant can have residency in 
multiple states, and section 1369(a)(1) does not exclude situations in which the defendant is also 
a resident of the state in which the accident occurred. This is likely to be significant in the case 
of a corporate defendant, who is “deemed to be a resident of any State in which it is 
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,” id. § 1369(c)(2), because its 
concurrent residence in the state of the accident site would not thereby exclude the corporation 
from the coverage of this provision. 
 22. Id. § 1369(a)(2). Although this provision also includes cases in which defendants are 
residents of the same state so long as one is also a resident of another state, it does indicate that 
single-defendant actions would have to qualify under either section 1369(a)(1) or (3). 
 23. Id. § 1369(a)(3). The Rowe and Sibley proposal from which these criteria were adopted 
was much broader in scope than the single mass accident jurisdiction implemented and included 
other types of actions, such as product liability suits. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 12, at 49 
(referring to “civil actions arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of related 
transactions or occurrences” (emphasis added) in the proposed statute). As a result, this 
criterion appears to have very little application in the present context, because there are very 
few situations in which an accident could occur both at a discrete location and with substantial 
parts in two states. Accidents that take place in interstate waterways and tunnels are examples 
of this limited set. There is some indication, however, that this category was included to capture 
all qualifying accidents involving interstate travel. See Laura Offenbacher, Note, The Multiparty, 
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act: Opening the Door to Class Action Reform, 23 REV. LITIG. 
177, 192–93 (2004): 
The language referring to a “substantial part” of the accident is designed to include 
cases in which an accident occurred in more than one judicial district, but it is not 
intended to expand the scope of the definition of “accident.” This qualifier could 
apply in accidents involving interstate travel, such as airplane crashes and train 
wrecks. 
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these additional criteria from suggestions of scholars who had 
originally proposed a form of multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction.24 
Although in most instances these restrictions will probably not be 
material, they help confine the scope of the expanded jurisdiction. 
Section 1369’s jurisdictional grant presents two initial questions 
about scope that the statutory text does not directly answer and that, 
therefore, will be for judicial interpretation. The first question is how 
broadly “accident” should be construed given the statute’s startlingly 
unhelpful definition. The second question is whether jurisdiction 
under section 1369 is limited to personal injury and wrongful death 
suits only. 
Section 1369 jurisdiction is triggered by “a sudden accident, or a 
natural event culminating in an accident.”25 This definition, however, 
provides little guidance in defining the scope of section 1369. One 
question of particular interest is whether this definition captures 
criminal or terrorist acts, clearly sudden and unforeseen to victims but 
not so to perpetrators. Neither the text nor the legislative history of 
MPMF 2002 indicates whether Congress intended terrorist acts to 
trigger section 1369 jurisdiction. Standard and legal usage of the term 
“accident” disagree as to the relevance of intent.26 However, the way 
that the term is used in federal regulations defining aircraft 
accidents—a type of catastrophe that Congress clearly contemplated 
as within the scope of section 136927—would capture qualifying events 
even when caused by criminal acts.28 
 
(footnote omitted). 
 24. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 12, at 49 (proposing a draft statute, portions of which 
were adopted by the drafters of MPMF 2002). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(4). 
 26. Whether the term “accident” excludes intentional acts may differ according to the 
context in which it appears. Compare BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL 
USAGE 13 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that, as contrasted with mistake, “an accident occurs without 
the willful purpose of the person who causes it”), with AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 10 (4th ed. 2000) (defining an accident as “[a]n unexpected and 
undesirable event, especially one resulting in damage or harm”). 
 27. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 28 (2001) (“[MPMF 2002] addresses a particular species of 
complex litigation, the so-called disaster cases, such as those involving airline accidents.” 
(quoting statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary)). 
 28. See Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue 
Aircraft, and Preservation of Aircraft Wreckage, Mail, Cargo, and Records, 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 
(2003) (explaining that, in the context of federal transportation regulations regarding aircraft, 
“accident means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft . . . in which any 
person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage”). 
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Furthermore, from a policy perspective, the distinction between 
events caused “accidentally” and those resulting from criminal 
planning has no apparent relevance to the goals and objectives behind 
the creation of MPMF jurisdiction. All other circumstances being 
equal, it seems illogical that victims of an airplane crash resulting 
from negligent maintenance should have a federal forum whereas 
victims of a similarly devastating crash resulting from inadequate 
security measures that permitted third-party action should lack access 
to a federal court. Both types of cases have identical tendencies 
toward duplicative, redundant litigation. Additionally, the explicit 
inclusion of accidents resulting from natural disasters29 indicates that 
Congress was more concerned with accident characteristics likely to 
affect subsequent litigation than with the nature of the causes behind 
covered accidents. However, the ambiguity as to the definition of 
“accident,” particularly as it relates to potential terrorist attacks, will 
likely persist until courts confront the issue. 
Although the definition of “accident” could preclude application 
of section 1369 jurisdiction to some cases falling under the policy 
objectives of consolidation and joint adjudication, the openness of 
section 1369’s jurisdictional grant to “any civil action”30 could have 
the opposite effect, creating federal jurisdiction in some cases outside 
such objectives. The statutory use of the seventy-five-fatality 
threshold comprises only part of the definition of qualifying 
accidents—it does not mean that only suits by the estates of people 
killed can qualify.31 This construction of “any civil action” is 
consistent with the desire to consolidate all common-issue suits; 
common liability issues could arise from claims of personal injury or 
property damage, as well as from claims relating to fatalities. 
Inclusion of a subject matter restriction, such as limiting jurisdiction 
to claims of personal injury or property damage, was a policy choice 
that some earlier proposals suggested.32 However, Congress adopted 
 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(4). 
 30. Id. § 1369(a). 
 31. See id. (qualifying “any civil action” with the phrase “where at least 75 natural persons 
have died in the accident at a discrete location”); see also Offenbacher, supra note 23, at 193–94 
(“[T]he statute allows injured parties and people who suffered property damage to file suit as an 
original matter as long as they have minimal diversity and their injuries arise from the requisite 
accident.”). 
 32. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 12, at 51 (offering suggestions as to when subject matter 
limitations (such as those included in a 1979 Department of Justice study, Diversity of 
Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform—1979: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
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no such restriction in the text of section 1369. For this reason, section 
1369 potentially applies in cases arising out of a qualifying accident 
but involving neither a risk of duplicate litigation nor good 
opportunities for consolidated adjudication. For example, a contract 
suit against or between insurers regarding coverage related to a 
qualifying accident could come into federal court under section 1369 
even absent the kinds of common issues that arise when multiple 
victims bring separate suits. Such cases, although technically 
qualifying for federal jurisdiction under section 1369, would not 
present the dangers of multiple litigation that Congress intended 
MPMF 2002 to address. 
B. Going Back to State Court: The Local Controversy Exception 
The questions underlying the relatively well-drafted provisions of 
section 1369(a)’s jurisdictional grant pale in comparison to the 
difficulties that courts seem likely to face when interpreting section 
1369(b). Section 1369(b) demands that courts abstain from hearing 
cases authorized by section 1369(a) when such cases meet certain 
criteria indicating that the controversies in question relate primarily 
to a single state.33 This “local exception” threatens to raise at least two 
major problems in implementation, one practical and the other 
normative. First, the provision is drafted so vaguely that concern 
about its language was among the first topics of commentary on 
MPMF 2002.34 Additionally, interpretation of section 1369(b) was the 
issue before the Federal District Court for the District of Rhode 
Island when it became the first court called upon to apply MPMF 
2002.35 The provision’s sole guidance as to the boundaries of its 
 
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th 
Cong. 158–62 (1979)) would fit into the proposed statute). 
 33. See infra text accompanying note 42. 
 34. See Georgene Vairo, Editorial, An Important Act with Two Antecedents: More 
Controversial Than the Original, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at B7 (“[O]ne wonders how much 
litigation will result over how a ‘substantial majority’ of plaintiffs would be quantified, or who 
the ‘primary defendant’ is . . . .”); see also Offenbacher, supra note 23, at 199 (pointing out the 
inherent subjectivity of the statutory language and noting several publications that discuss this 
problem). 
 35. In Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.R.I. 2004), the court decided a motion to 
dismiss based on application of the local exception. The cases before the court arose out of the 
Station nightclub fire and required the court to make several interpretive decisions relating to 
section 1369(b). As an initial matter the court determined that the local exception operates as a 
statutory mandatory abstention provision limiting the exercise of the federal jurisdiction granted 
by section 1369(a) rather than as a condition on the grant of jurisdiction itself. Id. at 56–57. 
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application comes in ambiguous terms such as “substantial majority 
of all plaintiffs,”36 “primary defendants,”37 and “primarily” governing 
law38—terms that courts seem bound to have difficulty interpreting.39 
Any outcome appears possible, from the exception’s complete 
uselessness to its complete swallowing of MPMF 2002’s entire original 
jurisdictional authority. Second, application of the local exception, 
however broadly courts interpret it, threatens once again to split suits 
between federal and state proceedings, creating duplicate litigation.40 
Thus, applying the local exception in some cases qualifying for federal 
consolidated treatment under section 1369(a) would exacerbate the 
very result that Congress enacted MPMF 2002 to correct. 
Although the local exception does not involve the exercise of 
judicial discretion,41 its criteria leave a lot of room for flexibility. 
Section 1369(b) mandates that a district court authorized to hear a 
case under section 1369(a) must nonetheless abstain from doing so if 
“(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single 
State of which the primary defendants are also citizens; and (2) the 
claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that State.”42 
The statute provides no further guidance as to what constitutes the 
“substantial majority of all plaintiffs” or the similarly vague concepts 
 
Although that distinction has a variety of potential practical consequences, id. at 56, it does not 
have any significance for the analysis in this Note. Therefore, throughout this discussion the 
local exception is referred to interchangeably as a jurisdiction limitation or an abstention 
requirement. 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. § 1369(b)(2). 
 39. A dispute over the meaning of a “substantial majority” of plaintiffs and “primary 
defendants” was the center of the court’s jurisdictional inquiry in Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. 
Supp. 2d at 58–63. The Passa court concluded that the “substantial majority” of plaintiffs is 
determined by “whether the number of potential plaintiffs from a single state makes up a 
substantial majority of all potential plaintiffs with claims arising from the same disaster.” Id. at 
60; see infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. Although the estimated 44.18% of potential 
Station plaintiffs from Rhode Island is larger than any other group, it could not be said to 
constitute a substantial majority of the total. Id. at 60–61. The court interpreted the “primary 
defendants” to include “all defendants facing direct liability, and excluding all defendants joined 
as secondary or third-party defendants for purposes of vicarious liability, indemnification or 
contribution.” Id. at 62. Based on that definition, it was simple for the court to conclude that not 
all of the primary defendants in the cases were Rhode Island residents. Id. at 63. 
 40. Plaintiffs otherwise qualifying for diversity jurisdiction could still bring suit in federal 
court. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (“The district court shall abstain from hearing any civil 
action . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 42. Id. 
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of “primary defendants” and “primarily” governing law.43 The District 
of Rhode Island considered these phrases in the first of the Station 
nightclub fire cases, Passa v. Derderian,44 and that court’s analysis is 
likely to shape the discussion of these issues in subsequent cases. The 
Passa court’s interpretation of the section 1369(b) test may prove 
particularly important, because judicial interpretation of these terms 
will have a large impact both on the state interests that section 
1369(b) aims to protect and on MPMF 2002’s ability to alleviate the 
problem of split and duplicate litigation. 
For example, inquiry into what constitutes a “substantial 
majority of all plaintiffs” would be complicated by the inclusion of 
accident victims yet to have filed suit. The Passa court was 
particularly concerned about the results of limiting the definition of 
“all plaintiffs” for this purpose. The court based its analysis of this 
factor on an estimation of the number of “all potential plaintiffs, 
meaning all those who have died or suffered injury as a result of the 
tragedy at issue.”45 Strictly limiting the interpretation of “all 
plaintiffs” to those actually involved in the cases under consideration, 
the court understood, “would frustrate Congress’ desire for 
consolidation.”46 If courts applied the local exception strictly as 
drafted—i.e., relative to actual plaintiffs only and before 
consolidation of related suits—a few individual cases might be 
excluded from federal jurisdiction under section 1369(b), even though 
they actually form part of a larger national series. This result would 
occur in cases in which plaintiffs were citizens of the same state as at 
least one defendant and in which that state’s law was likely to apply. 
Under such circumstances, individual suits arising from the same 
accident could have disparate access to federal courts—the very 
situation that MPMF 2002 seeks to eliminate. 
Analogous ambiguity exists as to whether “all plaintiffs” includes 
plaintiffs who have already settled their claims.47 If such plaintiffs are 
 
 43. For an analysis of the appropriate construction of section 1369(b) drawing on 
legislative history and similar language in class action statutes, see Offenbacher, supra note 23, 
at 198–205. 
 44. 308 F. Supp. 2d at 58. 
 45. Id. at 60. Because the exact number of potential plaintiffs was, and will remain for some 
period of time, incalculable, the Passa court founded its conclusion that a “substantial majority” 
were not all citizens of the same state on a statistical extrapolation from the citizenship 
information of the known victims. Id. at 60–61. 
 46. Id. at 59. 
 47. Offenbacher, supra note 23, at 201. 
RAFOTH FINAL.DOC 2/25/2005 2:31 PM 
2004] MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM LITIGATION 267 
excluded from the “substantial majority,” the result could be 
distortion in favor of either federal treatment of what was in reality a 
primarily local controversy or federal rejection of a controversy that 
was truly national in scope. However, tracking individuals who have 
settled seems both unnecessarily costly in a jurisdictional inquiry and, 
perhaps, insensitive to the actual needs and preferences of plaintiffs 
who remain in a case. 
Application of the section 1369(b) local exception may lead to 
split litigation in another way. Even if section 1369(b) functions as 
intended, it does not exclude plaintiffs who have another basis on 
which to assert federal jurisdiction. Thus, individual plaintiffs may 
still file their suits in federal court if they meet the requirements of 
regular diversity jurisdiction,48 but those plaintiffs who are nondiverse 
or minimally diverse will be relegated to a separate state court action, 
a result contrary to the stated objectives of MPMF 2002.49 
II.  INTERSYSTEM CONSOLIDATION UNDER MPMF 2002 
MPMF 2002 also encourages joint adjudication through 
mechanisms designed to join additional related claims to claims 
already pending in federal court under section 1369 jurisdiction. By 
providing for intersystem consolidation mechanisms—intervention 
and removal50—MPMF 2002 attempts to further reduce duplicative 
litigation and increase efficiency by providing joint federal 
adjudication of state law claims that could not have come into federal 
court as original matters, even under section 1369.51 This Part analyzes 
 
 48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (granting federal jurisdiction when there is complete 
diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants, as well as an amount in controversy exceeding 
$75,000 per plaintiff). 
 49. In the Station fire situation, for example, three cases (in addition to those at issue in 
Passa) have been transferred to the District of Rhode Island from Massachusetts and 
Connecticut. See Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 59. The Passa court used one of these cases, in which 
jurisdiction was based on the general diversity statute, to illustrate that a “case-by-case” 
determination of the substantial majority of all plaintiffs “would foster the possibility for 
inconsistent discovery rulings and even verdicts on liability.” Id. at 59–60. 
 50. Although intervention is not technically a consolidation mechanism because it does not 
combine two existing actions, this Note treats it as such because, absent the authority under 
section 1369(d) to join claims to an existing federal action, intervening plaintiffs would have no 
choice but to file a separate action, probably in state court. 
 51. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 12, at 24 (“When such scattered litigation occurs, a 
federal action-consolidating jurisdiction could achieve the economies sought by the permissive 
joinder rules, reduce the danger of inconsistent outcomes, and counteract the case-splitting 
effects of the complete diversity rule.”). 
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the effectiveness of intersystem consolidation mechanisms in 
maximizing the number of suits related to section 1369(a) accidents 
that can be consolidated in the federal system and then examines how 
the drafting of MPMF 2002’s removal provision may present both 
constitutional and practical obstacles to the realization of the 
consolidation objective. 
A. Joining an Existing Action: Intervention and Removal 
MPMF 2002’s intervention and removal provisions are roughly 
analogous mechanisms. Intervention is available to plaintiffs wanting 
to join an existing federal action rather than initiate a separate state 
court suit;52 removal is a possibility for defendants wishing to 
consolidate related state and federal actions to which they are party 
rather than defend duplicative matters in separate court systems.53 
Because joint adjudication of common issues can strategically benefit 
either or both parties, MPMF 2002 is fair in providing roughly parallel 
opportunities for both plaintiffs and defendants. 
Section 1369(d) provides that, in any action authorized by section 
1369(a), “any person with a claim arising from the accident . . . shall 
be permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff . . . even if that person 
could not have brought an action in a district court as an original 
matter.”54 This provision allows plaintiffs who otherwise would have 
to initiate separate state suits to join existing federal actions 
pertaining to the same accident. 
Also, this intervention provision could be used as a workaround 
to the first instance of split litigation arising from the section 1369(b) 
exception.55 Early plaintiffs who would be excluded on the basis of 
section 1369(b) even though their cases involved a national 
controversy could wait to join a federal action when filed if they 
strongly preferred a federal forum. 
 
 52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(d) (Supp. 2003) (“[U]nder this section, any person with a claim 
arising from the accident . . . shall be permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff in the 
action . . . .” (emphasis added)). Generally, intervention is available for plaintiffs under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 24, but the statutory authorization allows intervention as of right under 
circumstances that would only allow intervention at the judge’s discretion under Rule 24. 
 53. See id. § 1441(e) (allowing removal by MPMF defendants even if the state suit could 
not have been brought as an original matter in federal court). 
 54. Id. § 1369(d). 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 45–46. 
RAFOTH FINAL.DOC 2/25/2005 2:31 PM 
2004] MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM LITIGATION 269 
Allowing intervention under section 1369(d) is an effective use of 
the permissiveness of a minimal diversity rule to maximize joint 
adjudication of common-issue claims, because joining a nondiverse 
plaintiff will never destroy minimal diversity in suits in which it 
already exists. Intervention is particularly efficient in MPMF 2002 
cases because it allows later-joining plaintiffs to receive adjudication 
of common issues without duplication of pretrial effort, particularly 
discovery, completed before they joined a case. 
Just as intervention gives potential plaintiffs the option of 
combining their claims with an existing one, MPMF 2002’s removal 
provision, section 1441(e), provides an analogous option for 
defendants. Through section 1441(e) removal, defendants can join 
cases initiated in state court with related federal suits to which they 
are also party.56 This feature provides an additional means of 
consolidating litigation efficiently resolvable jointly and gives 
defendants some degree of control over their exposure to multiple, 
related suits and potentially inconsistent judgments. Section 1441(e) 
provides for removal by any defendant57 in a state court action when 
either “the action could have been brought . . . under section 1369”58 
or 
the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have been 
brought, in whole or in part, under section 1369 . . . and arises from 
the same accident as the action in State court, even if the action to 
be removed could not have been brought in a district court as an 
original matter.59 
Section 1441(e) removal is thus intended to further promote joint 
adjudication when it makes sense for defendants as well as plaintiffs. 
State actions removed under section 1441(e)(1)(B) by a common 
defendant to a pending federal action need not themselves qualify for 
original federal jurisdiction.60 This category of cases includes not only 
nondiverse state court actions outside the scope of section 1369(a), 
but also some actions within section 1369(a) but subject to the section 
 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e). 
 57. Section 1441(e) removes the standard limitation for diversity cases that an action 
cannot be removed when a defendant is a citizen of the state in whose courts the action is 
pending. Id. § 1441(b), (e). 
 58. Id. § 1441(e)(1)(A). 
 59. Id. § 1441(e)(1)(B). 
 60. Id. 
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1369(b) local exception.61 Section 1441(e), however, cannot prevent 
split litigation from arising when the section 1369(b) exception is 
applicable to all suits arising from a given accident. In such cases, 
common defendants cannot remove their suits to federal court 
because any pending federal action would necessarily have been 
brought under section 1332 diversity jurisdiction and so could not 
serve as the predicate action for section 1441(e) removal. 
Section 1441(e) also contains a unique “reverse removal” 
provision mandating that actions invoking its removal authority 
ordinarily be remanded to the originating state court for individual 
damage proceedings after completion of the consolidated federal 
liability phase.62 Plaintiffs thus retain their forum choice when the 
policy interest in providing a single forum is weakest, in the 
determination of damages.63 Damages issues often do not lend 
themselves to consolidated treatment because of necessary factual 
determinations relating to individual injury. But when a federal court 
 
 61. Whether any actions excluded under section 1369(b) would be eligible for section 
1441(e) removal probably depends in large part on how “substantial majority of all plaintiffs” is 
interpreted for purposes of section 1369(b). See supra Part I.B. If the “substantial majority” 
determination is based only on the plaintiffs in the action before the court, it is conceivable that 
a subsequent action based on the same accident could come under section 1369(a) and not be 
similarly excluded under section 1369(b). In such a case, a common defendant could then 
remove the first case back to federal court to join the subsequent action under section 
1441(e)(1)(B). 
 62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(2): 
Whenever an action is removed under [section 1441(e)] and the district court to 
which it is removed or transferred under section 1407(j) has made a liability 
determination requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district court shall 
remand the action to the State court from which it had been removed for the 
determination of damages, unless the court finds that, for the convenience of parties 
and witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should be retained for the 
determination of damages. 
Note that this provision only applies to the court to which the action is removed; the reference 
to “transfer” under section 1407(j) is a meaningless drafting error because that provision, 
proposed in earlier versions of MPMF 2002, was not included in the final package that Congress 
enacted. See infra Part III (discussing the implications of the failure to amend section 1407 in 
the final version of MPMF 2002). 
 63. Determination of damages generally involves individual questions of fact that make 
consolidated determinations both impractical and undesirable. The prevalence of individual 
questions in the determination of damages in mass accident cases is among the reasons that such 
cases have never been considered good candidates for class treatment. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 983 
n.71 (1998) (describing a general relaxation of judicial hostility toward mass tort class actions, 
but noting that mass accidents, as opposed to products liability cases, “such as a bus, airplane, or 
train crash may have more individual questions of causation and damage predominating over 
the common questions of duty and negligence”). 
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finds that “for the convenience of parties . . . and in the interest of 
justice” an action should be retained for the determination of 
damages, the court has the discretion to do so.64 Such discretion could 
be exercised, for example, to facilitate consolidated determination of 
punitive damages, thereby preventing multiple, competing state 
awards.65 
B. Bringing Too Much to Federal Court: Potentially Unconstitutional 
Removals 
MPMF 2002 maximizes its jurisdictional reach by including a 
removal provision that captures some state court cases that could not 
have been brought in federal courts as original matters.66 Although 
joining nondiverse state claims with related federal actions is not itself 
constitutionally problematic in the context of minimal diversity 
jurisdiction, the specific drafting of section 1441(e), which requires 
that a state case be removed by the federal court “embracing the 
place where the [state] action is pending,”67 may present some Article 
III hurdles to implementation. 
State court cases removed under section 1441(e)(1)(B) over 
which federal courts lacked original jurisdiction do not independently 
qualify for federal jurisdiction under section 1369 or any other 
statute. Because section 1441(e)(1)(B) requires that these actions 
involve a mass accident satisfying the requirements of section 
1369(a),68 state cases falling into this category are limited to actions in 
which the parties are completely nondiverse and the claims are based 
entirely on state law.69 Thus, this subset of actions is barred from 
 
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(2). 
 65. Consolidating punitive damages determinations was a stated congressional objective 
for creating MPMF jurisdiction. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 5 (2001) (“[A]n effective one-time 
determination of punitive damages would eliminate multiple or inconsistent awards arising from 
multiforum litigation.”). A specific provision for consolidated determination of both liability 
and punitive damages would have been codified in a related amendment to the multidistrict 
litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000), proposed by the House but rejected in the final 
version of MPMF 2002. See infra notes 90–104 and accompanying text. 
 66. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (Supp. 2003); see supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1). 
 68. The existing federal action must “[arise] from the same accident as the action in State 
court,” id. § 1441(e)(1)(B), and must have been raisable under section 1369. In other words, the 
common accident must meet the threshold fatality requirement of section 1369(a) for the 
federal action to constitute the basis for removing the state action. 
 69. Two exceptions to this generalization are possible but unlikely. First, a minimally 
diverse action in this context would fail to qualify for original jurisdiction under section 1369(a) 
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independent jurisdiction in federal courts not only by the limits of 
statutory authorization, but by the constitutional limits of federal 
jurisdiction.70 
Because minimal diversity is maintained, the joinder of these 
claims with the federal actions on which their eligibility for removal is 
predicated71 creates a constitutionally permissible consolidated action. 
Such consolidated actions are also permissible under section 1369, 
because joining removed claims would not affect the application of 
any of that section’s requirements. Thus, to the extent that section 
1441(e) removal of nondiverse state law actions results in their 
consolidation with existing federal cases, such removal is analogous to 
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.72 Application of section 
1441(e) in that context reflects an exercise of congressional authority 
that is both allowable and reasonable to achieve judicial efficiency in 
adjudicating mass accident litigation.73 
The text of section 1441(e)(1)(B), however, does not demand 
consolidation of removed state cases with existing federal cases in 
situations when the plaintiffs could not have brought their state cases 
in federal court originally. Instead, section 1441(e) mandates that a 
state case be removed to the federal district court embracing the court 
in which the state action is currently pending,74 regardless of where 
the existing federal case is pending. 
 
if none of the defendants had a residence outside the state in which the accident occurred. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1369(a)(1)–(3); supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. Second, disqualification 
of an action under section 1369(b), the exception for predominantly local controversies, would 
render it ineligible for original federal jurisdiction (if it did not qualify on another basis, such as 
section 1332 complete diversity). In that situation, the application of section 1369(b), which 
mandates that a “district court shall abstain from hearing” those actions, id. § 1369(b) (emphasis 
added), may preempt a defendant’s right to remove the action after it is refiled in state court, 
even if the defendant is subject to another suit in federal court. 
 70. Claims based exclusively on state substantive law must be at least minimally diverse for 
a federal court to hear them constitutionally. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (establishing that section 1369 claims are eligible for 
removal when “the defendant is a party to an action which . . . arises from the same accident as 
the action in state court”). 
 72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (allowing federal courts to hear supplemental state law 
claims when the claims form part of the same “case or controversy” as a claim properly within 
the court’s original jurisdiction). 
 73. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 5.01 cmt. d at 234 (“The presence of a proper 
federal action to which the state suit will be attached and the requirement that the state actions 
be transactionally related to the federal one means that the assertion of jurisdiction over those 
actions is analogous to the court’s supplemental jurisdiction powers.”). 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (Supp. 2003). 
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Unfortunately, this section 1441(e) venue provision, together 
with the omission of a consolidation requirement, makes it likely that 
the removal provision is constitutionally defective as drafted. The 
venue provision is consistent with the standard employed in ordinary 
removal cases75 to minimize disruption of the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum, but the provision makes it possible, even probable, that a state 
case removed under section 1441(e)(1)(B) will not find itself in the 
court hearing the pending federal matter based on the same accident. 
In such a situation, removal under section 1441(e)(1)(B) would 
present a district court with a nondiverse state law case that it would 
have no constitutional authority to hear.76 
It is generally agreed that a district court lacking subject matter 
jurisdiction over a case also lacks authority to transfer the case under 
the general transfer provision, section 1404(a).77 This restriction 
precludes the use of transfer under section 1404(a) to consolidate 
state and federal claims relevant to a section 1441(e)(1)(B) removal 
when the state claims lack independent jurisdiction in the district 
court to which they are initially removed. However, in such 
circumstances, it may be possible for courts to transfer cases under 
section 1631, which permits transfer to cure want of jurisdiction for 
some civil actions.78 To transfer a case under section 1631, a district 
 
 75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) (establishing for standard removal cases that “[e]xcept 
as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a state court of 
which the district courts . . . have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to 
the district court . . . for the district and division embracing the place where such action is 
pending”). 
 76. This applies only to cases that do not have another independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction. If, for example, a removed case was completely diverse and only filed in state court 
as a matter of the plaintiff’s choice of forum, there would be no problem with the removal 
court’s assertion of jurisdiction. 
 77. See, e.g., Grimsley v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 147, 148 (D.S.C. 
1993) (“When the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it does not have the power to transfer 
pursuant to § 1404(a).”); see also 17 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 111.14, at 111-115 (3d ed. 
2004) (“A district court’s power to transfer an action under Section 1404(a) . . . depends on the 
existence of subject matter jurisdiction (diversity, federal question, or some other basis for 
federal subject matter jurisdiction) over the action.”); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3844, at 322 (2d ed. 1986) (“Transfer under § 1404(a) is 
possible only if venue is proper in the original forum and federal jurisdiction existed there. If 
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, there is no power to do anything with the case except 
dismiss.”). But see Dornbusch v. Comm’r, 860 F.2d 611, 613 (5th Cir. 1988) (“There are cases in 
which the transferor court lacked jurisdiction in the technical sense. Here the circuits appear to 
have been split.”). 
 78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631: 
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court must determine “(1) if there is another court in which the action 
could have been brought at the time it was originally filed, and (2) 
whether a transfer is in the interests of justice.”79 Although the text of 
section 1631 theoretically allows such transfers, as of yet it has been 
used only in suits originally filed in federal court and has not been 
tested in the removal context. 
Congressional intent to allow these state claims into federal court 
suggests that it is in the interest of justice that such claims be 
transferred to the court hearing the related federal claim for 
consolidation. Therefore, satisfying the second requirement for 
section 1631 transfer should not be controversial in most cases. 
The first requirement for section 1631 transfer, that there be 
another federal court in which the suit could have been brought, is 
more problematic. Whether the intended transferee court, the one 
hearing the existing federal case, meets this standard will depend 
entirely on whether courts in this context choose to analyze the issue 
by considering the state claim standing alone or as part of the 
consolidated action.80 Given that neither section 1441(e)(1)(B) nor 
section 1631 mandates that a state action be consolidated with a 
related federal action once transferred to the court hearing the 
 
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court finds that there is a want 
of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or 
appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought 
at the time it was filed or noticed . . . . 
This statute was intended for use, and has in fact been almost exclusively used, in cases filed in 
an ordinary federal district court that properly belong in one of the specialized federal courts: 
Ordinarily, a district court must dismiss an action if it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction . . . . If, however, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
particular categories of actions or appeals because a federal statute vests exclusive 
subject matter jurisdiction in a specified court, the district court may transfer the 
action to that court under Section 1631. 
17 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 77, § 111.51[1] at 111-185. Of course, when 
general federal subject matter jurisdiction, either diversity or federal question, is involved, the 
inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction almost always pertains to the entire federal system 
rather than to a specific federal district. In such cases, transfer to a different district would not 
cure any defect. The situation contemplated here—that transfer could enable jurisdiction by 
combining actions pending in different districts—is unique and has not yet been considered with 
respect to section 1631’s understanding of a jurisdictional defect. 
 79. Grimsley, 818 F. Supp. at 148. 
 80. If the transferee court considers the removed case independently, the court will not 
have jurisdiction, because the case will remain in the same situation as before transfer—it will 
remain a completely nondiverse state law action. If, however, the transferee court bases the 
jurisdiction determination on the entire consolidated action, the defect is cured and a section 
1631 transfer is proper. 
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section 1369 action, such consolidation is purely discretionary.81 A 
transferee court, therefore, would not be required to consider related 
cases together when making jurisdictional determinations.82 Thus, 
although a section 1631 transfer offers some promise as a practical 
workaround to the drafting error in section 1441(e), it does not 
eliminate the facial constitutionality problem and may be inapplicable 
in the absence of a requirement that the related actions be 
consolidated after removal and transfer. 
The section 1441(e) drafting problem, which creates statutory 
authorization for possibly unconstitutional removals,83 is one that 
Congress could remedy relatively easily. At least as to actions 
removed under section 1441(e)(1)(B),84 Congress should amend 
section 1441(e) to require removal, not to the district court 
“embracing the place where the action is pending,”85 but instead 
directly to the district court in which the predicate federal action is 
pending. Although this change would depart from traditional respect 
for the plaintiff’s choice of forum, in this context that policy interest is 
less compelling than it is in the context of the traditional removal of a 
single, independent suit. The ultimate intention behind allowing 
 
 81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a): 
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the 
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the 
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders 
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
 82. When a court is not obligated to consolidate two related cases, it seem illogical that it 
would be compelled to consider them as a unit for the jurisdiction determination because, 
ultimately, they could be heard as independent controversies. 
 83. For the removal to be unconstitutional in practice, the state case would have to be 
completely nondiverse. Suits based on accidents of sufficient scope (seventy-five fatalities) to 
invoke the provision, even if brought by a single plaintiff, generally involve multiple corporate 
defendants. Such defendants often have two states of citizenship, and the citizenship of the 
plaintiff has minimal logical correlation with the defendants’ citizenship. In such circumstances 
minimal diversity seems a low-threshold requirement. However, this would be important for 
cases in which individual plaintiffs selected defendants to avoid federal diversity jurisdiction. 
See note 69, supra, for discussion of other situations in which removal of a state law claim would 
be impermissible. Also, in the event that the federal district court to which a case lacking 
original jurisdiction is removed happened to be hearing the related federal case—eliminating 
the need for a venue transfer—it would probably be constitutional for that court to exercise its 
authority to consolidate the cases. 
 84. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (Supp. 2003). The other category of actions authorized for 
removal by section 1441(e) is those that could have been brought originally under section 1369. 
See id. § 1441(e)(1)(A). In such cases, there is no requirement that a federal action related to 
the same accident already be pending, so the current provision for removal to the district 
embracing the current venue is both constitutional and sensible. 
 85. Id. § 1441(e)(1). 
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removal of section 1369-related actions is the consolidation of related 
proceedings for joint adjudication of common issues.86 That objective 
is impossible to accomplish without displacing the claims of some, or 
even most, plaintiffs from the locality in which the plaintiffs filed their 
claims initially. The plaintiff’s choice of forum in these actions, 
although important, should not be enough to prevent removal to a 
district court not embracing the state action.87 In fact, amending 
section 1441(e) as suggested here would simply accomplish in one 
step what under the current version requires two—removal followed 
by transfer for consolidation. 
Once it becomes established that a federal district court may 
constitutionally hear a state claim, the propriety of removing the state 
claim directly to a district other than that embracing the state court in 
which the state claim was pending seems consistent with the 
principles of transfer for consolidation within the federal system.88 
Therefore, the solution that this Note proposes not only provides a 
constitutional means of asserting jurisdiction over the state claim, but 
also furthers the efficiency goals of the MPMF 2002 scheme by 
consolidating in a single step cases removed from state court for that 
purpose. 
III.  INTRASYSTEM CONSOLIDATION UNDER MPMF 2002 
Getting related claims into federal district courts, whether 
through section 1369 original jurisdiction or via intersystem 
consolidation, does not alone accomplish the goals of an MPMF 
scheme; once the claims are in federal courts, they must be 
consolidated into a single forum. To accomplish this goal, there must 
be statutory authority to transfer all the cases to a single court, which 
can then consolidate them, as appropriate, for joint determination of 
common legal and factual issues.89 
 
 86. See generally AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 5, introductory cmt. at 218 (discussing a 
proposal, with similar consolidation objectives, by which a central body similar to the current 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation would remove cases and would decide both questions 
of appropriate consolidation and what district court should receive the cases). 
 87. See id. § 5.01, cmt. d, at 234 (“Other than certain aspects of convenience, none of the 
reasons that a plaintiff chooses a state court creates a vested, let alone a constitutional, right to 
remain there.”). 
 88. For analysis of consolidation of cases under MPMF 2002 once they are in the federal 
system, see Part III, infra. 
 89. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).  
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Early versions of MPMF statutes and related proposals clearly 
assume the existence of intrasystem consolidation authority through 
the combined use of section 1407 for pretrial proceedings90 and 
section 1404 to retain the consolidated cases for trial in the transferee 
court. This was a reasonable assumption because, before 1998, federal 
courts regularly employed the section 1407-section 1404 statutory 
combination to effectuate intrasystem consolidation for trial.91 This 
solution was occasionally cumbersome because the statutes involved 
were not originally intended to operate in tandem,92 but courts used it 
successfully for thirty years to promote efficiency by keeping cases 
before judges already familiar with the cases’ facts, issues, and 
parties.93 
In 1998, however, the Supreme Court foreclosed future use of 
section 1404 to retain and try actions originally transferred under 
section 1407. In Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & 
Lerach94 the Court held that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
the remand language of section 1407(a) “bars recognizing any self-
assignment power in a transferee court”95 and therefore “precludes a 
 
 90. Section 1407 provides for transfer and consolidation of related claims for pretrial 
proceedings only: 
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in 
different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel 
on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that 
transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses 
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so 
transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such 
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have 
been previously terminated . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 108-416, at 3 (2004); see AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 3, 
introductory cmt. at 22 (noting that, after the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transfers 
a case for pretrial proceedings under section 1407, “the transferee judge frequently retains the 
actions for trial. . . . either because the parties consent or pursuant to a change of venue under 
Section 1404” (citations omitted)); DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 3.2, at 21 
(1986) (“[T]he transferee court can consider a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1404(a). . . . [especially when] the [Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation] transfers a 
number of actions filed in various districts around the country to a transferee district that 
happens to be the most convenient for trial.” (footnote omitted)). 
 92. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 3, introductory cmt. at 22 (“The procedures 
under [section 1407 and] section 1404 . . . were developed separately and were not designed to 
be used together. Thus, the combination often is clumsy . . . .”). 
 93. H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 2 (2001). 
 94. 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
 95. Id. at 40. 
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transferee court from granting any section 1404(a) motion.”96 The 
Court recognized that consolidation for trial may, in fact, be 
advantageous in the resolution of these cases, but left the issue for 
Congress to resolve.97 
After Lexecon, any statutory mechanism for consolidating 
complex cases for trial, such as MPMF 2002, must include either a 
general amendment to section 1407 overruling or modifying the 
Lexecon rule,98 or a specific exception to section 1407 providing for 
consolidation for trial in the subset of cases that the legislation 
covers.99 Because consolidation for trial is very important for 
achieving the efficiencies sought in multiforum cases,100 versions of 
MPMF jurisdiction proposed in Congress after Lexecon, as well as at 
least one version before the decision, included explicit language 
amending section 1407 for this purpose.101 
Despite Congress’s awareness of the need to reform section 
1407,102 it passed MPMF 2002 without any provision to amend that 
section.103 The House of Representatives’ version of MPMF 2002 
included both a general Lexecon fix and a specific provision dealing 
with cases that were or could have been brought under the new 
section 1369 jurisdiction. However, neither of those provisions 
survived in the version of the statute that emerged from the Senate 
 
 96. Id. at 41 n.4. 
 97. Id. at 40. 
 98. An example of this approach, which appeared in many attempts to pass some form of 
MPMF jurisdiction before success in 2002, is the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial 
Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 2112, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). Such a “Lexecon fix” has been 
advocated in Congress because of the benefits that it would confer in its own right, even apart 
from its particular importance in the MPMF context. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-416, at 4 (2004) 
(“[T]here is a pressing need to recreate the multidistrict litigation environment that existed 
before Lexecon.”). 
 99. This approach would be analogous to the provision for trial consolidation already 
provided for actions brought under section 4C of the Clayton Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(h) 
(2000) (allowing the consolidation of both pretrial and trial proceedings for actions brought 
under section 4C of the Clayton Act).  
 100.   See H.R. REP. NO. 108-416, at 5 (“The disaster litigation portion of H.R. 860 [MPMF 
2002] . . . contemplates that the Lexecon problem is solved.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, H.R. 860, 
107th Cong. §§ 2, 3(c) (2001) (version passed by House of Representatives on Mar. 14, 2001); 
Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 2112, 106th Cong. § 2 
(1999); Multiparty, Multiform Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong. § 4 (1990) 
(version passed by House of Representatives on June 5, 1990). 
  102. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 2–3 (2001) (describing the background and need for a 
Lexecon fix). 
 103. See H.R. 2215, 107th Cong. § 11,020 (2002) (enacted as MPMF 2002). 
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Judiciary Committee and was eventually enacted, meaning that the 
implementation of MPMF 2002 left section 1407 unchanged.104 
Ironically, the drafters who changed the House of Representatives’ 
version of the statute failed to remove from the adopted text of 
section 1441(e) a reference to section 1407(j), which would have been 
created by the House version’s amendment to section 1407 but is 
otherwise nonexistent.105 The result, whether intentional or by 
accidental omission,106 is that MPMF 2002 jurisdiction now operates 
with only previously existing consolidation mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, these existing mechanisms do not specifically provide 
for joint adjudication of liability or punitive damages, the key 
objectives of MPMF 2002.107 
Even in its present form, however, MPMF 2002 can achieve some 
benefits of intrasystem consolidation. Cases in the federal system 
through section 1369 or section 1441(e) can be consolidated for 
pretrial proceedings under current section 1407.108 Consolidation at 
 
 104. Compare H.R. 860, §§ 2, 3(c) (version referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
Mar. 15, 2001 after being received from House of Representatives), with Multiparty, Multiforum 
Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11,020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826–29 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1391, 1441, 1697, 1785 (Supp. 2003)), and Multiparty, Multiforum Trial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2002, S. 3050, 107th Cong. (2002) (version introduced in Senate on Oct. 3, 
2002). 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(2) (Supp. 2003); see supra note 62 (quoting section 1441(e)(2) and 
discussing the drafting error). 
 106. It appears likely that the deletion of the general Lexecon fix was an intentional result of 
negotiations between the House of Representatives and the Senate. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-416, 
at 5 (2004) (“Pursuant to negotiations, the conferees agreed to take ‘half’ of H.R. 860—section 
3, or the ‘disaster’ litigation portion.”). The omission of the section 1407 amendment specifically 
applicable to MPMF 2002 cases, however, is more mysterious, given that it had been included in 
the bill as part of the disaster litigation package rather than as part of the Lexecon fix. See H.R. 
860, § 3(c) (version referred to Senate Judiciary Committee on Mar. 15, 2001 after being 
received from House of Representatives). Congress’s failure to enact that provision, at least, has 
unanticipated consequences for the effectiveness of MPMF 2002. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-416, at 
5 (“[T]he transferee court still cannot retain the consolidated cases for determination of liability 
and punitive damages, which effectively guts the statute.”). 
  The Senate made the same change with respect to the Senate version of the 1988 
MPMF bill that passed the House of Representatives. AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 3, 
introductory cmt. at 24 (referring to the Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988, H.R. 
4807, 100th Cong. § 303 (1988)). Of course, in that pre-Lexecon era, the only impact of the 
omission was the loss of complete clarity as to the transferee court’s authority, because the 
practice of self-transfer under section 1404 to accomplish the same ends was still alive and well. 
 107. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 5 (“The revisions should reduce litigation costs as well as 
the likelihood of forum-shopping in airline accident cases; and an effective one-time 
determination of punitive damages would eliminate multiple or inconsistent awards arising from 
multiforum litigation.”). 
 108. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). 
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this stage facilitates discovery and witness efficiencies.109 Pretrial 
consolidation can also promote settlement, because defendants can 
deal with all or most of the potential claims at one time, instead of 
contending with the uncertainty of large numbers of separate, 
potentially inconsistent, liability determinations. Also, as a purely 
practical matter, pretrial consolidation covers most cases in their 
entirety; “[i]n reality . . . cases gathered under Section 1407 hardly 
ever reach trial or return to their districts of initiation because most 
often they are settled in the transferee court.”110 
Additionally, the possibility of trial consolidation still exists when 
the individual transferor judges to whom actions are remanded 
choose to use section 1404(a) to transfer the actions back to the 
transferee court.111 This solution is “cumbersome, repetitive, costly, 
potentially inconsistent, time consuming, inefficient, and a wasteful 
utilization of judicial and litigant resources,”112 and it does not 
guarantee reconsolidation of all or even most of the previously joined 
cases. Nevertheless, it provides an opportunity for judges to work 
cooperatively to facilitate an efficient solution when separate trials 
are clearly against the interests of both litigants and the judicial 
system. 
 
 109. See Earle F. Kyle, IV, The Mechanics of Motion Practice Before the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 589, 590 (1998) (“Consolidated or coordinated pretrial 
proceedings resulting from Panel transfer orders can provide tremendous benefits. Parties can 
save time and expense by avoiding duplicative discovery and minimizing the burden on non-
parties who may be compelled to testify or produce documents in similar actions scattered 
around the country.”). 
 110. AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 3, introductory cmt. at 22. In the post-Lexecon years 
1999–2002, only 10 percent of the terminated multidistrict cases resulted in remand to the 
transferor court for trial. The remainder were terminated in the transferee court. From 
September 1998 to September 2002, 51,639 cases that had been subjected to section 1407 
proceedings were terminated, and of those 5,110 were terminated through remand. See ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 67 tbl.S-20 (2003) (collecting and presenting section 
1407 actions from 1999 through 2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judbus2002/tables/s20sep02.pdf; id. 78 tbl.S-21 (2003) (collecting and presenting section 1407 
actions from 1997 through 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/s21sep99.pdf. 
There is no apparent reason that cases entering section 1407 proceedings as a result of the 
availability of MPMF jurisdiction should differ substantially in the proportion of actions that go 
to trial from the complex cases for which that mechanism has already been in use, but as yet 
there has been no opportunity for empirical validation of that assumption. 
 111. H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 3. 
 112. Id. (quoting Hearing on H.R. 2112 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual 
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 5 (June 16, 1999) (statement of the 
Honorable John F. Nangle, Chairman, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation)). 
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Section 1404(a) transfer requires (1) that the transfer be “in the 
interest of justice” and (2) that the suit could have been originally 
brought in the transferee court.113 In the context of remanded section 
1407 proceedings, satisfaction of the first prong of the test appears 
relatively obvious, because all parties and many witnesses have 
already been subject to pretrial proceedings relating to the same case 
in the transferee court. The transferor judge also faces “a significant 
‘learning curve’ regarding the merits, discovery issues, and other 
matters associated with the case in order to be prepared” to try a 
remanded case.114 The further risk of inconsistent judgments may 
make it in the interest of justice to cooperate in transfer for 
reconsolidation. All of these factors, although not conclusive, lead 
toward a conclusion that further adjudication of common issues, such 
as liability, in a single proceeding in the transferee court is desirable 
for all parties. 
However, problems arise regarding the second transfer 
requirement of section 1404, that the transferee district be one in 
which the suit originally “might have been brought.”115 Unlike the 
section 1407 transfer for pretrial proceedings, a section 1404 transfer 
for reconsolidation requires that the transferee court meet all 
personal jurisdiction and venue requirements.116 The MPMF 2002 
cases that would face the greatest difficulty qualifying for section 1404 
transfer would be those cases removed under section 1441(e) that do 
not qualify for independent Article III jurisdiction in any federal 
court. Although it is unclear how courts would deal with such cases 
once removed,117 if they treated them as independent actions, the 
cases could not qualify for section 1404(a) transfer because they could 
not have been brought in the transferee court originally.118 If, 
 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 114. Kyle, supra note 109, at 605. 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 116. See Kyle, supra note 109, at 606 (“Unlike § 1407 Panel transfers . . . §§ 1404 and 1406 
authorize transfer only if personal jurisdiction and venue lie in the transferee court.”). Note that 
these requirements also applied to section 1404 self-transfers to a transferee court for trial in the 
pre-Lexecon era as well, so these issues are not new except in cases brought under MPMF 
jurisdiction, which did not exist before Lexecon. This just presents an additional set of 
advantages to enacting a statutory transfer provision applicable to the situation. 
 117. See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text. 
 118. The only district in which a federal court could have original jurisdiction over such 
cases would be the district in which they were joined with the federal case upon which removal 
jurisdiction was predicated. See supra text accompanying notes 71–73. This would be the 
transferor, not the transferee, court. 
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however, courts considered the removed claims in this category as 
part of the controversy that they formed when consolidated with the 
predicate federal claim, section 1404(a) transfer would be a viable 
option for the transferor judge.119 
Section 1404 transfers by transferor judges for the purpose of 
reconsolidation for trial are probably more readily available in 
MPMF cases than in section 1407 cases based on general diversity 
jurisdiction, because of the more generous personal jurisdiction120 and 
venue provisions available under MPMF 2002.121 This approach, 
however, still relies on the coordination and initiative of multiple 
transferor judges to be an effective or efficient option. 
The benefits of a statutory provision allowing section 1407 
consolidation for trial in the wake of Lexecon may become more 
obvious as courts attempt to deal with suits brought under section 
1369 absent such a provision. In fact, Congress appears to have 
realized the scope of this difficulty in implementing MPMF 2002, and 
legislation is pending to reinstate the section 1407 amendments 
omitted from the original enactment.122 It seems clear that, in section 
1369 cases, the omission of what would have been sections 1407(i)–
(j)—creating a general self-transfer for trial provision and a provision 
specifically authorizing consolidation for trial, with a presumption 
toward remand for determination of individual damage issues123—
prevents realization of the full benefits that MPMF 2002 jurisdiction 
could have achieved for both litigants and the judicial system. Even 
absent such a provision, however, the availability of pretrial 
 
 119. For discussion of this issue with respect to section 1631, see supra notes 78–82 and 
accompanying text. 
 120. The existence of nationwide service of process, 28 U.S.C. § 1697 (Supp. 2003), indicates 
that Congress intended a national contacts standard for personal jurisdiction, a standard that is 
appropriate in section 1369 cases. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 3.08, at 157: 
Complex diversity litigation has all of the characteristics that currently justify the 
national-contacts standard: (1) the need to provide a forum for litigation to correct 
and control severe problems in the national economy that are likely to involve parties 
across the country acting in a similar fashion or being injured by similar conduct; (2) 
the need to provide a forum where all parties can be subjected to jurisdiction, when 
no single state has that power; and (3) the need to provide a convenient forum for 
litigation to marshall and conserve the assets of an insolvent party. 
 121. See infra Part IV.A. 
 122. Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004) 
(version passed by House of Representatives on Mar. 24, 2004); H.R. REP. NO. 108-416,  
at 4–5 (2004). 
 123. Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, H.R. 860, 107th 
Cong. §§ 2, 3(c) (2001) (version passed by House of Representatives on Mar. 14, 2001). 
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consolidation under section 1407 and the potential use of section 
1404(a) by transferor judges to reconsolidate should still provide 
efficiency gains in adjudicating cases admitted to the federal system 
through section 1369 or section 1441(e). 
IV.  PROCEDURAL FACILITATION OF MPMF 2002 
In addition to the core jurisdiction and consolidation mechanisms 
already discussed, other procedural provisions are important, even 
necessary, to the effective implementation of a joint adjudication 
scheme such as MPMF 2002.124 These provisions, such as nationwide 
service of process and choice of law, are the nuts and bolts of 
constructing effective consolidated actions. This Part briefly outlines 
the relevant provisions included in the MPMF 2002 package and then 
examines the impact of the omission of a statutory choice-of-law 
provision. 
A. What’s In: Nationwide Service of Process and Venue 
To facilitate the functioning of MPMF 2002’s core jurisdiction 
and consolidation provisions, the statute includes enabling features 
related to service of process, subpoena authority, and venue. These 
provisions exert the authority of the federal system to solve the 
problem to which MPMF 2002 responds: redundant litigation 
resulting from the inability of a single state forum to gather all of the 
parties and claims together for efficient resolution.125 
Section 1697 provides for nationwide service of process.126 
Although common in federal question cases, nationwide service in 
diversity-based actions is more unusual127 and indicates that, for the 
 
 124. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 12, at 28 (“[R]efinement and supplementation [of the 
jurisdiction] by other features such as process, removal, transfer, and choice of law are also 
necessary.”). 
 125. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 12, at 9 (“The problem is the unavailability of any single 
forum in which to consolidate scattered, related litigation—a difficulty that is becoming more 
and more common given the increasing number of complex tort actions, such as those growing 
out of mass accidents and product liability claims.”). 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 1697 (Supp. 2003). 
 127. The present situation is analogous to federal statutory interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 
(2000), which uses jurisdiction based on minimal diversity to provide a single forum for bringing 
together parties who might not all be joined in a single state court action, and includes a 
provision for nationwide service of process, id. § 2361. As with federal interpleader, courts 
handling consolidated cases brought into federal court under MPMF 2002 operate on behalf of 
the national judicial system, rather than on behalf of the judicial system of the states in which 
they happen to sit. 
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purposes of MPMF 2002-defined cases, the federal courts are 
operating in a national capacity rather than more or less as courts of 
the states in which they sit.128 Nationwide subpoena authority is also 
available for these cases.129 
The federal venue statute was amended by MPMF 2002 to 
provide venue rules specific to actions brought under section 1369.130 
Under section 1391(g), MPMF 2002 suits can be brought in any 
district in which a defendant resides or in the district in which the 
accident occurred.131 This provision is generally analogous to the 
provision applicable in general diversity cases, but it omits reference 
to districts in which a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.132 
This distinction, like the provision for nationwide service of process, 
may constitute evidence that Congress intended MPMF 2002 to 
operate on a national contacts basis. In that case, defendants subject 
to personal jurisdiction anywhere in the U.S. would be subject to 
jurisdiction in all federal districts, making personal jurisdiction 
inapplicable as a restriction on venue in section 1369 cases. 
B. What’s Out: Statutory Choice of Law 
MPMF 2002’s jurisdictional authority is a subset of the federal 
courts’ constitutional diversity jurisdiction.133 Under Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Electronic Manufacturing Co.,134 federal courts sitting in 
diversity have long been required to apply the choice-of-law 
principles of the forum state.135 The related principle that transferee 
courts must apply the choice-of-law rules that would have applied in 
 
 128. For the same reason, defendants in MPMF 2002 cases in federal court are subject to a 
Fifth Amendment due process standard of personal jurisdiction (minimum national contacts), 
rather than to the Fourteenth Amendment standard (minimum state contacts) applicable to 
state courts. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 3.08, at 156 (“[J]ust as an analysis of state 
contacts and fairness [is] pertinent to the decision of whether a particular assertion of 
jurisdiction violates the Fourteenth Amendment, reference to national contacts and fairness 
appears to be proper for determining whether Fifth Amendment constraints are satisfied.”). 
 129. 28 U.S.C. § 1785 (Supp. 2003). 
 130. Id. § 1391(g); see Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-273, § 11,020(b)(2), 116 Stat. 1758, 1827 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391).  
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(g). 
 132. Compare id. (applicable in MPMF 2002 cases), with id. § 1391(a) (applicable in general 
diversity cases). 
 133. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 134. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 135. Id. at 496. 
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the transferor jurisdiction was established in Van Dusen v. Barrack136 
to avoid a change in the applicable law when a case is transferred 
within the federal system.137 Thus, absent any constitutionally 
permissible mandate from Congress, a court presiding over a 
consolidated MPMF 2002 case is left to determine choice of law under 
the guidance of state principles inherited from each transferor 
jurisdiction. This situation poses extremely problematic consequences 
for effective consolidation,138 because it forces the transferee court to 
make an individual determination of the applicable law for each 
transferred action and potentially apply several different states’ 
substantive law to the consolidated issue.139 These determinations 
 
 136. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
 137. See id. at 639 (requiring a transferee court to apply the law of the original jurisdiction 
for transfers under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a)); 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4506, at 115 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that this rule also applies for 
section 1407 transfers). 
 138. The anticipated choice-of-law complexity in MPMF 2002 actions arises not from the 
presence of each individual action in federal court, but from their consolidated treatment for 
trial. Thus, without the Lexecon fix, see supra notes 98–107 and accompanying text, choice of 
law will be no more a problem in these cases than under other section 1407 consolidations of 
pretrial proceedings. In fact, when the national interest lies in joint adjudication of similar 
claims, the need and justification for federal choice-of-law principles is particularly strong. See 
AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 6, introductory cmt. at 317 (“The decision to apply federal 
choice of law criteria in multiparty, multiforum cases is tied to those situations in which 
Congress determines that there is a need for uniform rules of decision. That need seems clearest 
when it is for the purpose of fostering consolidation.” (citation omitted)). 
 139. Commentators disagree as to whether the consolidation of related claims alone justifies 
changing choice-of-law principles that would have applied to each case if tried separately. 
Compare Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 549 
(1996): 
Because choice of law is part of the process of defining the parties’ rights, it should 
not change simply because, as a matter of administrative convenience and efficiency, 
we have combined many claims in one proceeding; whatever choice-of-law rules we 
use to define substantive rights should be the same for ordinary and complex cases. 
with Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law 
Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077, 1087 (1987): 
It is one thing to contemplate the disparate ways different state laws may resolve a 
given dispute; it is quite another to accept such disparities in the context of a mass 
tort suit consolidated in a single forum adjudicating, for example, the identical claims 
of passengers sitting side by side aboard an airplane. 
Of course, simply applying the choice-of-law principles of the forum state to all of the 
consolidated actions, the straight Klaxon result, is not a logical alternative either because it 
would result in the arbitrary application of one state’s policy-driven choice rules to all claims, 
even when some of the claims could not originally have been filed in the courts of that state. See 
Rowe & Sibley, supra note 12, at 38: 
In [federal interpleader or MPMF] situations, the Klaxon rule . . . creat[es] the 
possibility of applying to some litigants a substantive state law regime that could not, 
but for the federal jurisdiction, have governed them . . . . It makes little sense to 
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significantly reduce the efficiencies gained from consolidated 
treatment and add a layer of complexity threatening to overwhelm 
proceedings.140 Although in many cases, both before and after 
Lexecon, courts handling consolidated actions under section 1407 
have efficiently managed the intricacies created by the principle of 
Van Dusen, some courts have called for legislative action to establish 
uniform rules.141 
The lack of choice-of-law guidance in MPMF 2002 could present 
the largest implementation problem for courts hearing cases under 
the statute.142 When MPMF cases are consolidated, these concerns 
become magnified because the transferee court faces the ironic result 
that it is required to apply multiple sets of choice-of-law rules to cases 
brought into federal court primarily to facilitate their efficient and 
uniform treatment.143 Until the federal courts have an opportunity to 
consider some of these cases, how large of a hurdle the application of 
 
oblige the federal court to follow the conflicts law of a state in whose courts it might 
not even have been possible to bring the case. 
 140. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 6, introductory cmt. at 306 (“The rationale for 
developing federal choice of law standards for complex litigation is to decrease forum shopping 
and to reduce the extremely complicated inquiry now needed to ascertain and apply the 
numerous state choice of law rules that may be relevant in a consolidated action.”); Linda S. 
Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. 
L. REV. 1039, 1076 (1986): 
Choice-of-law problems significantly increase the complexity, expense, and duration 
of mass-tort litigation. . . . [S]ubstantial judicial resources must be applied to 
determine the applicable law. After the applicable law is determined, the lawsuit can 
grind to a halt while the court determines whether to apply state or federal rules to a 
particular legal question. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 141. See Stephen R. Stegich & Donald P. Yates, MDL Consolidation of Aviation Disaster 
Cases Before and After Lexecon, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 226, 230 (2000) (“Section 1407 does not 
simplify choice of law issues, and some courts have called for legislative action to establish 
uniform choice of law rules. Courts themselves have managed to simplify these issues, for 
example, through effective use of conflict analysis to ascertain a state law that governs all 
cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 142. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 6, introductory cmt. at 309 (“A significant 
difficulty for a transferee court under the current choice of law regime is that it is required to 
consult the state choice of law rules of each of the transferor jurisdictions.”). 
 143. See James A. R. Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation 
Rules and the Common Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1994): 
Klaxon’s application of state rules in federal diversity cases seems ill-equipped for 
cases whose complicated scope and multi-party character engage the national 
interest. In complex litigation, at least, there is little justification for applying state 
choice-of-law rules rather than a special multi-jurisdictional or national rule that 
would take account of the broad, national complexion of most air disaster claims and 
the national interest in their fair and consistent disposition by the courts. 
(footnotes omitted). 
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the Klaxon and Van Dusen principles will be to the joint adjudication 
of mass accident liability issues will remain largely unknown. It is 
possible that, in the narrow category of major disasters, state choice-
of-law principles and even substantive liability standards will vary 
insubstantially, making determinations of applicable law in 
consolidated proceedings less cumbersome than anticipated.144 
However, given the potential for substantial inefficiencies, Congress 
should act to forestall unnecessary wrangling by prescribing federal 
choice-of-law principles for uniform application in section 1369 cases. 
Amending MPMF 2002 to include a federal approach to choice 
of law for these mass accident trials would conform with the federal 
policy of uniform treatment without impinging on the sphere of state 
authority, because these cases represent situations that could not have 
been brought in a single state court. Congress could prevent much 
uncertainty inherent in federal application of state choice-of-law 
principles145 by specifying a uniform, predictable standard for such 
cases in the federal system. Additionally, establishing federal choice 
of law rules would give claimants notice of the applicable principles 
and the contexts in which courts would apply them, avoiding the 
unfairness in the tendency of courts to fudge existing choice-of-law 
principles to simplify matters in consolidated actions.146 
Establishing uniform federal rules would certainly provide notice 
to plaintiffs filing suit in federal court under section 1369. However, 
 
 144. See Kramer, supra note 139, at 584: 
[B]ecause variation in the legal rules is not great, once the state-by-state survey is 
completed, judges will find a relatively small number of conflicts and an equally small 
number of approaches to choice of law. At that point, claims can be grouped and the 
task of resolving the conflicts completed in a fairly efficient manner. It may not be 
fun, but it is far from impossible. 
 145. It is always unclear whether a federal judge will interpret state conflicts law correctly, 
let alone consistently with other federal courts, making even application of a given state’s law an 
uncertain matter. See In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 
1975) (noting that choice of law in litigation over an aircraft accident “is a veritable jungle, 
which, if the law can be found out, leads not to a ‘rule of action’ but a reign of chaos dominated 
in each case by the judge’s ‘informed guess’ as to what some other state than the one in which he 
sits would hold its law to be”). 
 146. See Kramer, supra note 139, at 554: 
[J]udges in complex cases have managed to suppress these differences [among 
approaches to conflicts of law]. Some say that the various tests, while different, all 
share the same basic objective . . . . Other judges collapse approaches together, 
asserting that they use different words to describe what are really identical inquiries. 
Still other judges purport faithfully to apply the assorted tests only to find . . . that all 
happen to mandate the same result in the particular case. 
(footnotes omitted). 
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there would inevitably be some disruption of plaintiffs’ choice-of-law 
expectations when they originally filed their suits in state court and 
became subject to federal choice-of-law principles only after 
subsequent removal and consolidation.147 Concern for this class of 
plaintiffs, who are suffering removal from their preferred court, or 
even state, is legitimate and should be balanced against the 
inefficiencies created by the application of multiple states’ choice-of-
law principles. In light of the national interest in efficient and fair 
adjudication of such claims, it may be possible to accommodate the 
interests of displaced plaintiffs sufficiently within the choice-of-law 
principles selected for consistent application, rather than to abandon 
the claims to the case-by-case application of Klaxon and Van Dusen. 
Scholars have proposed three general approaches for 
implementing federal choice-of-law rules: (1) Congress could 
authorize the courts to develop a federal common law approach,148 (2) 
Congress could specify factors for consideration in a court’s choice-
of-law determination,149 or (3) Congress could provide specific choice-
of-law rules for application in these situations.150 
The development of federal common law principles would 
eliminate the need for courts to apply multiple sets of choice-of-law 
principles in consolidated cases.151 The primary advantage of a 
common law approach is its flexibility to deal with the different 
 
 147. There is no constitutional right to the application of a particular law to the facts of a 
case, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 315–16 (1981) (rejecting the defendant 
insurance company’s argument that the Constitution mandated the application of the laws of 
the state in which the insured resided), and there is no reason to believe that fair and 
predictable federal choice-of-law rules would implicate a plaintiff’s due process rights, see id. at 
312–13 (articulating the constitutional standard for choice-of-law rules that they be “neither 
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair” and result in the application of the substantive law of a state 
having an interest arising from significant contact with the subject matter). However, plaintiffs 
traditionally control the decision as to where to bring their suits and, by extension, over what 
substantive law will decide their claims. 
 148. This is the default rule when courts have the authority to make choice-of-law 
determinations but lack guidance. 
 149. See, e.g., Rowe & Sibley, supra note 12, at 57 (considering factors including which law 
would have applied in the absence of federal jurisdiction and the potential change in applicable 
law as a result of transfer or consolidation). 
 150. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 6.01, at 321–23 (drafting model rules with the 
stated objective of choosing a state law that could be applied to all similar tort claims against a 
given defendant). 
 151. Of course, federal common law could develop to mandate the application of state 
choice-of-law principles of either transferee or transferor courts, which would raise anew the 
above-discussed concerns touching the application of current doctrine under Klaxon and Van 
Dusen. See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances of each case or set of cases, because judges can adapt 
the rules that develop as necessary. MPMF 2002 jurisdiction is 
already limited to a very specific subset of cases (mass-fatality, single-
occurrence accidents), however, so the inherent adaptability of the 
common law is unlikely to provide significant benefits in this context. 
This approach would not solve the problems of uncertainty and 
nonuniformity now plaguing the system of applying state rules.152 
Instead, the common law approach could exacerbate the existing 
uncertainty problem by making the choice of law dependent on 
consolidated litigation’s random assignment to a particular court, 
because principles might never be harmonized across the federal 
system. 
Prior versions of MPMF legislation took the approach of 
specifying factors for courts to consider in making its choice-of-law 
determinations,153 but Congress dropped this approach from MPMF 
2002 to accommodate Senate concerns that the provision gave the 
district courts too much discretion.154 Congress has thus manifested a 
willingness to include a federal choice-of-law clause in an MPMF 
package, but it has yet to find a political solution to enable itself to do 
so. Factor-based determinations have the advantage of being flexible 
yet targeted toward promoting the policies deemed most important. 
However, such determinations do not guarantee that different courts 
will balance the factors consistently. Therefore, they are not ideal for 
achieving uniform federal treatment of similar cases. 
Statutory definition of specific choice-of-law principles for courts 
to apply has the ultimate advantage of consistency and uniformity. 
However, the policy consensus required to draft and pass such a 
provision may be unattainable. Drafting specific rules would be 
particularly desirable in MPMF 2002 cases because such cases stem 
from shared mass accidents. It seems fundamentally illogical that a 
single defendant facing multiple suits in a consolidated action faces 
 
 152. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 6, introductory cmt. at 314 (“[T]he federal 
common law approach has several distinct disadvantages. Not only will uncertainty and a lack of 
uniformity continue, at least until the courts determine what the standards should be, but also 
there is no assurance that a single federal standard ever will evolve.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Multidistrict, Multiforum, Multiparty Trial Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 
2112, 106th Cong. § 3(e) (1999) (version referred to Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 14, 
1999 after being received from House of Representatives); Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction 
Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong. § 6 (1990) (version reported in House of Representatives 
Jun 1, 1990). 
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 8 (2001). 
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different choice rules (and, potentially, different substantive law) 
regarding a common liability issue involving a discrete accident. 
Because all injuries in a set of related MPMF 2002 cases will have 
occurred in a discrete event at a discrete location, competing state 
interests relate to all of the injuries in the particular set of cases in the 
same way. Given that these interests interact similarly for each claim 
relating to a particular accident, the balancing of these interests 
would ideally result in the same choice-of-law decision (although not 
necessarily in the application of a single state’s law) for all of the 
cases. To get this result predictably, however, this balancing of 
relative state interests should be accomplished in advance through the 
drafting of a set of standard federal choice-of-law rules to govern 
these instances, not after the fact through a common law 
determination in each individual case.155 
The precise content of such standard rules represents a policy 
determination. In making its policy choices, Congress should focus on 
the federal policies resulting in federal jurisdiction over these cases—
judicial economy and fairness to parties—rather than on any 
substantive regulatory agenda. This approach would minimize 
intrusion upon states’ interests in the application of their relevant 
substantive laws.156 By definition, choice of law ultimately involves the 
elevation of one state’s interest in a dispute over the interests of other 
states; federal courts should make such choices only pursuant to 
legitimate federal interests, thereby avoiding choices among 
competing state substantive policies. Proposals for choice principles 
in mass accident cases vary greatly, from choosing the most plaintiff-
 
 155. The earlier congressional proposal may have been overly simplistic, however, in 
suggesting that courts create a rebuttable assumption that a single state’s substantive law should 
apply to all issues and parties in cases arising out of the same accident. See H.R. 2112,  
§ 3(e)(1)(b) (version referred to Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 14, 1999 after being 
received from House of Representatives): 
The district court making the [choice-of-law] determination . . . shall enter an order 
designating the single jurisdiction whose substantive law is to be applied in all other 
actions under section 1369 arising from the same accident as that giving rise to the 
action in which the determination is made. The substantive law of the designated 
jurisdiction shall be applied to the parties and claims in all such actions before the 
court, and to all other elements of each action, except where Federal law applies or 
the order specifically provides for the application of the law of another jurisdiction 
with respect to a party, claim, or other element of an action. 
 156. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 6, introductory cmt. at 315 (“[A] distinction 
should be drawn between state policies that reflect substantive, regulatory rules, and the federal 
policies underlying the proposed choice of law rules, which are limited to resolving conflicting 
substantive state policies.”). 
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friendly substantive law related to an accident,157 to simply applying 
the substantive law of the state in which the accident occurred.158 
The lack of any federal choice-of-law rule stands to frustrate the 
goals of MPMF 2002. Although courts hearing consolidated actions 
may find ways to construe state choice rules so as to minimize 
variation in the applicable rules and substantive law, such flexibility 
does not exist in individual MPMF 2002 actions that, for one reason 
or another, are not consolidated.159 In both situations, the similar 
treatment of similarly situated parties that MPMF 2002 intends to 
foster will not be realized if the courts are compelled to follow Klaxon 
and Van Dusen. 
CONCLUSION 
MPMF 2002 is a valiant attempt to solve a long-recognized 
problem that had historically evaded political consensus. The statute, 
however, bears marks of hasty drafting and political compromise that 
severely limit the effectiveness with which it can accomplish its goals 
of promoting the fair and efficient resolution of litigation arising from 
mass disasters such as the Station fire. Drafting problems affect both 
the intersystem and intrasystem aspects of consolidation under 
MPMF 2002, such that the statute as enacted provides opportunities 
for joint adjudication of common issues only marginally greater than 
the opportunities available under standard removal160 and 
multidistrict litigation161 statutes. Because MPMF 2002 is limited in 
 
 157. See Bird, supra note 139, at 1095 (“Insofar as two primary policy objectives of modern 
tort law are deterrence and compensation, a rule requiring selection of the law most favorable 
to the victims of mass torts is consistent with this well-established norm.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 158. See Thomas M. Reavley & Jerome W. Wesevich, An Old Rule for New Reasons: Place 
of Injury as a Federal Solution to Choice of Law in Single-Accident Mass-Tort Cases, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1992) (arguing, in the context of an earlier version of MPMF proposed in Congress in 
1991, that adoption of the substantive law of the place of injury in mass accident cases best 
accomplishes both fairness and efficiency). 
 159. A primary reason that MPMF cases would not be consolidated is the omission of 
consolidation for trial authority. See supra notes 102–07. 
 160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) for the general removal statute before the enactment of 
MPMF 2002. MPMF 2002 added section 1441(e), which deals specifically with cases under the 
jurisdiction added by that Act. See also AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, ch. 5, introductory cmt. 
at 219–20 (“Under current law the only opportunity for achieving intersystem consolidation is 
when certain defendants are permitted to remove state court cases to federal court under the 
general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, or one of the special removal statutes.”). 
 161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (providing for transfer of related actions for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation). Section 1407 was not 
amended by MPMF 2002. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
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scope,162 however, it seems possible that the statute and the courts’ 
ability to work around its weaknesses can be tested in a limited 
number of cases, allowing Congress to fix the most grievous problems 
relating to consolidation before too many suits are initiated under the 
statute. 
Faced with the many difficulties that complex litigation poses 
both for parties and for the judicial system, MPMF 2002 succeeds in 
providing equal access to federal courts in at least some 
circumstances. The imperfections of MPMF 2002, a version of 
legislation that has been floating around Congress for two decades, 
reflect problems inherent in the legislative process. Although the 
statute may not succeed in meeting all of its intended objectives, it 
represents a step toward improved handling of cases that have 
frustrated state and federal judicial systems alike as the frequency and 
complexity of mass tort litigation has exploded. 
 
 162. For example, between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2004, only two aircraft 
accidents in U.S. airspace would have satisfied the seventy-five-person fatality threshold: (1) on 
November 12, 2001, an American Airlines flight crashed in Belle Harbor, NY, resulting in 265 
fatalities, and (2) on January 31, 2000, an Alaska Airlines flight crashed off Port Hueneme, CA, 
killing eighty-eight. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, AVIATION ACCIDENT 
DATABASE & SYNOPSES, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp. That number 
excludes the four aircraft that crashed on September 11, 2001, three of which would have met 
the seventy-five-person fatality threshold, because of uncertainty as to whether terrorist acts 
could be classified as “accidents” for purposes of MPMF jurisdiction. See supra notes 26–28 and 
accompanying text. 
